

# Korean Legislative Voting on War Issues

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## Abstract

We investigate how electoral concerns at the district level affect foreign policy issues by examining the individual legislators' roll call decisions on the issue of sending troops to Iraq in the South Korea National Assembly. Our central claim is that South Korean legislators are sensitive to electoral concern when they decide to vote for war bills. The empirical findings confirm that there is a growing divergence of legislators' roll call behavior depending on their electoral marginality. However, the effect of a constituency is contingent upon partisan cleavages. The study represents the first empirical examination of the use of force in roll call vote behavior outside of the U.S. and Europe, focusing on electoral marginality. The study also affords interesting tests of several hypotheses concerning the factors driving legislative voting behavior in the realm of military policy.

Keywords: Roll-Call, Foreign Policy, South Korea, Electoral Marginality

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# 1 Introduction

In February 2004, despite widespread protest, the South Korean legislature voted 155 to 50 (with seven abstentions) to send 3000 South Korean troops to support the 660 military and engineering personnel stationed in Iraq the year before.<sup>1</sup> One year earlier, the South Korean government twice-delayed but ultimately approved the initial mission in Iraq in support of the United States coalition 179 to 68. Despite massive protests against both votes, the South Korean legislature decisively voted to deploy more troops to Iraq. Why did the legislature vote against what appeared to be a referendum on further troop deployments by the masses? To answer this question, we build on the existing legislative foreign policy voting research, largely in the US context. We examine how electoral concerns at the district level compete with partisan concerns and presidential leadership in foreign policy to examine individual members' vote choice on the issue of sending troops to Iraq and Afghanistan.

We find that members of parliament in South Korea take different positions on security issues depending on their party, ideology, and other attributes. In particular, a Member of Parliament (MP)'s roll-call behavior is driven by constituency concerns. Our findings indicate that the voting behavior of South Korean legislators is driven by electoral concerns much more so than national interest or presidential policy position concerns. While a growing number of researches has examined the role of parliaments in foreign policy beyond the context of Western democracies, little scholarship investigates the roll-call behavior of legislative members in foreign policy issues. Our research shows that theories of parliamentary voting in foreign issues usually applied to US and Western European contexts can be applied

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<sup>1</sup>“South Korea approves 3,000 troops for Iraq.” New York Times February 14 2004, <https://www.nytimes.com/2004/02/14/news/south-korea-approves-3000-troops-for-iraq.html> (accessed April 22, 2020).

to democracies in East Asia as well.

Our research proceeds in four parts. First, we discuss the context of foreign policy decision making in Korean politics and how it has changed over time. Following that, we then develop a theoretical framework to explain legislative voting on issues of foreign policy, specifically troop deployments to Iraq and Afghanistan. We then present our research design and the results of our analysis. Finally, we conclude with a discussion of our results both as it relates to the Korean context as well as how our research relates to other work on legislative voting and foreign policy.

## **2 The South Korean Parliament and Foreign Policy**

Before Korean democratization in the late 1980s, presidents, bureaucrats, and military officers were responsible for South Korean foreign policy. While the constitution of 1948 requires the consent of the legislature to ratify treaties and declare war, the role of the legislature during military dictatorship was limited. During the 1960s, when the government of Park Chung-Hee swiftly dispatched South Korean troops to Vietnam in accordance with United States requests, the incumbent party members acted as a rubber stamp and party members in opposition did not show any organized resistance. The legislature's passive role was due to South Korean political elites siding with US foreign policy during the Cold War regardless of their domestic political orientation. However, as the Cold War became a distant part of history, latent cleavages about South Korean foreign policy between political parties emerged.

A growing literature indicates that South Korea MPs have different political stances on

domestic policies depending on their ideology, party, and policy perspective (Hix and Jun, 2009; Jeon, 2006; Jun and Hix, 2010; Moon, 2005; Lee and Kil, 2012). For example, Hix and Jun (2009) show that ideological divisions are the driving force of Korean MPs voting among multiple issues along with region, and party. Similarly, scholars of South Korean politics have suggested several dimensions that explain MPs' voting behavior over foreign policy since the 2000s. Above all, partisan cleavages between conservatives and liberals that exist among domestic issues began to take shape in the foreign policy arena (Jang, 2008; Lee, 2005; Rich, 2014). While the emerging ideological divergence appears similar to that found in western party politics over foreign policy issues, the shape of these cleavages is somewhat different from the "traditional" left/right divisions over social policy (Boix, 1998; Calossi, Calugi and Coticchia, 2013; Devine, 2009; Fordham, 2002; Hofmann, 2017; Koch and Sullivan, 2010; Mello, 2012; Palmer, London and Regan, 2004; Schuster and Maier, 2006; Verbeek and Zaslove, 2015; Wagner et al., 2017, 2018). Legislative debates on foreign policy have centered on the question of North Korea and the US-ROK alliance issue.

The Cold War continues to cast a long shadow over the direction of South Korea's foreign policy due to the presence of conflict with North Korea. Conservative parties have maintained their antagonistic stance toward North Korea, similar to the governing parties under the former military regimes (Kang, 2008; Steinberg and Shin, 2006). On the other hand, liberal/progressive parties have held a position of trying to reconcile differences with North Korea. Under prior military regimes, liberal parties had to maintain an anti-communist stance so they would not be accused of colluding with the North Korean regime. Since the early 2000s, however, their reconciliation policy toward North Korea has been publicly clarified under two liberal presidents, Kim Dae-Jung and Roh Mu-Hyun.

Along with the North Korea issue, another controversy centers on South Korea's role in the US-Korean military alliance. During the Cold War era, South Korean military regimes relied upon military and economic assistance from the US to deter North Korea. To some extent, the US government endorsed the South Korean military regime as a vanguard for deterring communism in East Asia (Brazinsky, 2009; Oberdorfer and Carlin, 2014). However, after the end of the Cold War, more progressive political parties began a re-evaluation of the US-Korean military alliance. Liberal/progressive parties argued that an equal relationship with the US was necessary to secure South Korea's autonomy in foreign policy. On the other hand, conservative parties insisted that the US-Korea military alliance should be maintained due to the continued military threat from North Korea. Among various US-South Korea alliance issues, the Iraq War was placed in the center of this debate between Korea's foreign policy and the alliance-centric policy.

This conservative-liberal party divide was part of the legislative debate over foreign policy issues. Conservative parties exhibited strong support for sending South Korean troops to Iraq and Afghanistan to signal Korea's support of the steadfast alliance with the US to deter North Korean military threat and the rise of China (Chung, 2001; Im, 2006). For most conservative party members, the support for sending troops was not merely the result of following party lines, but was intended to reinforce their belief that the alliance with the US is a "blood brotherhood" in an effort to deter North Korea's military threat and the rise of China (Chiozza and Choi, 2012; Moon, 2004; Suh, 2007). On the other hand, liberal and progressive parties sought autonomy in foreign policy deviating from the influence of the US. They preferred to minimize South Korea's involvement in the war outside of the Korean peninsula. Growing partisan divergence on foreign policy is also related to the influx

of MPs who have different foreign policy perspectives. A considerable number of liberal party members supported the liberal governments' appeasement policy due to their desire for a peaceful reunification with North Korea. Liberal party members who were involved in democratization movements also believed military regimes and conservative parties used anti-communism as a convenient tool to preserve their political supremacy. For them, a peaceful resolution with North Korea was necessary not only for inducing a long-standing peace on the Korean peninsula but also for dismantling the Cold War consensus of Korean domestic politics and further democratization.

### **3 Electoral Marginality and Roll Call Voting in Foreign Policy**

Despite the growing interests in partisan cleavages in foreign policy debates, relatively few studies have examined the influence of constituency on Korean MPs' roll call behavior (Jun and Hix, 2010; Kim, Chang and Shin, 2013; Nemoto, 2009).<sup>2</sup> Specifically, few studies examine whether electoral competitiveness affects the roll call votes of Korean MPs on foreign policy issues. For example, while Kim, Chang and Shin (2013) considered the effect of electoral marginality on roll call votes in war issues, their study did not investigate how electoral marginality interacts with the ruling and the opposition partisan divisions on war votes in the Korean National Assembly.

Under presidential systems, members of the governing party (incumbent party) are subject to influence from both a party leader and the chief executive in their roll call behavior.

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<sup>2</sup>Most empirical studies of Korean legislative politics focus on the relationship between electoral marginality and voter turnout (Aran, 2008, 2011; Cho, 2006; Yun and Joo, 2010).

Governing party members would be more disciplined in legislative voting in situations where there is congruence between party leaders and the president than in a case where disagreement exists (Carey, 2007). During the legislative debate regarding sending Korean troops to Iraq, disagreements emerged between the governing party members and the president. Of course, the governing party members had little incentives to vote against the war bills not only because the president has influence in the party as party leader but because the president exercises power in the allocation of the budget at congressional districts (Mainwaring, Shugart and Lange, 1997; Shin and Lee, 2017). Simultaneously, confrontations between the executive and the opposition party were common across many legislative agendas, which gave the opposition party members little incentive to endorse the executive's proposal to send troops to Iraq and Afghanistan. The government-opposition dimension in South Korean legislative politics is similar to the cases of Western politics (Hix and Noury, 2016).

A growing body of literature focuses on the influence of constituents on the voting behavior of legislative members on issues of foreign policy. Not only do congressional members vote on economic issues to serve the interest of constituents and interest groups (Fordham and McKeown, 2003; Hiscox, 2002; Owen, 2017), they also respond to shifts in constituent opinion on issues of national security due to its linkage with their electoral fate (Gartner, Segura and Barratt, 2004; Grose and Oppenheimer, 2007; Kriner and Shen, 2007, 2014; Koch, 2011). These studies suggest there may not be a bi-partisan consensus at times and that the president does not always have a dominant influence on foreign policy issues.

Legislators face a dilemma common to many representative bodies. Once in office, there is little to constrain the legislators' behavior, introducing the risk of undesirable policymaking. One solution to this hazard is the ballot box. The threat of losing office can create incentives

for legislators to pay attention to their constituents (Ferejohn 1986, see also Fearon 1999). At the same time, legislators must also pay attention to their party. Party obligation as well as gaining resources and key committee assignments also influence legislator's voting behavior (Fenno, 1978; Hall and Wayman, 1990; Kingdon, 1989).

Research also suggests that legislators face electoral ramifications for unrepresentative behavior. Voters may sanction representatives for unpopular roll-call votes (Clark, 1996; Jacobson, 1993; Nyhan et al., 2012). Legislators are not punished for every legislative vote. Certain conditions may make some votes more salient to voters than others (Ansolabehere, Snyder Jr and Stewart III, 2001). Competitive district-level races are likely to make voters more informed over many issues (Lipsitz, 2011). And highly contentious issues or those that dominate the media will also make voters more aware of their legislators' roll-call votes.

The "marginal hypothesis" indicates that as representatives' electoral vulnerability increases, representatives will be closer to their constituents' preferences and are less loyal to party positions (Cohen and Brunk, 1983). Accordingly, the marginal hypothesis expects that more competitive districts produce more moderate candidates in two ways: (1) the candidates converge toward the mean position of their constituents; and (2) the issue positions of the candidate converge toward one's opponent (Sullivan and Uslander, 1978). Empirical findings suggest that legislators in competitive districts deviate more from their parties in roll-call voting to meet their constituents' preference so that they can retain office (Burden, 2004; Dye, 1961; Griffin, 2006; Kuklinski, 1977; MacRae, 1952; Patterson, 1961). But not all districts are competitive. Districts can also be safe districts which allow for an electoral cushion for incumbents. In such districts, legislators may pay less attention to constituent pressure and more attention to partisan issues and interest.

Building on the above, we expect that their electoral vulnerability influences South Korean MPs' roll call behavior on war issues. Research indicates that representatives' primary goal is reelection, and the reelection motive shapes their voting decisions (Fiorina, 1974; Mayhew, 1974). When salient events arise in the legislature and representatives are concerned with the effects of their roll call vote on their future electoral success, representatives will maximize their chances of re-election by voting along constituent lines meaning they may have to vote against the party's stated position. The marginal hypothesis states that constituents judge representative voting and preferences based in part on their representative's voting record. When the roll call records deviate from constituents' preferences, constituents are less likely to vote for the incumbent MP (Cohen and Rottinghaus, 2018).

In the context of South Korean politics, a growing grassroots movement altered the public's perception of foreign policy issues. The movement accelerated the public's understanding of foreign policy issues from one dominated by elite discourse to one that now rested on broader public policy concerns. Specifically, non-government organizations (NGOs) launched anti-candidate campaigns to punish pro-Iraq and Afghanistan war MPs and emphasized the burden of costs in war involvement (Hong, 2005; Kim, Choi and Cho, 2008). Encountering the growing influence of public opinion due to the mobilization of these grassroots movements, a group of the governing party members demanded revocation of the executive's decision to send troops. Some members of the opposition conservative party also began a bipartisan effort to oppose the executive's proposal aligning with the governing party members (Jaung, 2005). Overall, the increased role of the grassroots movement and the public's growing attention toward legislative agenda caused Korean MPs to become concerned with the electoral consequences in their roll call decisions.

If the legislative agenda is not based on broad public support and the outcome of the policy on electoral consequences is uncertain, legislators should consider whether there is a need for pandering to constituencies. Figure 1 illustrates how Korean public opinion on the plan of dispatching troops to Iraq and Afghanistan fluctuated over time. Without strong general support for war issues among the Korean public, legislative members might be more likely to vote along constituent lines than along party lines, given their electoral concerns. Specifically, MPs from competitive districts would be more likely to deviate from the party line and the president than those from safe districts. The increased role of the grassroots movement and the public's growing attention to foreign policy transformed the legislative debate on war into the issue of whether legislators can produce a sound foreign security policy and provide programmatic goods. Korean MPs became concerned that their roll call decisions in war issues would face electoral consequences.

To test our marginal hypothesis, we examine how Korean MPs' electoral competitiveness influences their roll call behavior on war issues. The governing party members have incentives to vote yes and back the president, but electorally vulnerable members are more likely to defect and vote against the president. We also expect that conservative party members are less likely to vote yes when they are in competitive districts, although supporting the US military intervention in Iraq and Afghanistan accords with the party line and their ideological preferences.



Figure 1: South Korea Public Opinion on Troop Dispatch and the Extension of Troop Deployment between March 2003 and November 2007

Note: We selected 28 publicized polls i) that were conducted by Korean newspapers, broadcasts and polling organizations, ii) and asked the public about support for sending troops to Iraq and Afghanistan and continuing the deployment of troops. We calculated the mean if there were more than one poll.

*Hypothesis 1: Members of governing parties are less likely to vote yes on the bills that send troops to Iraq and Afghanistan as their electoral marginality increases*

*Hypothesis 2: Members of conservative opposition parties are less likely to vote yes on the bills that send troops to Iraq and Afghanistan as their electoral marginality increases*

A legislative roll call analysis of the South Korean parliament contributes to a broad understanding of the role of domestic politics in foreign policy decision making beyond the context of the US and Western Europe. A growing number of studies extend the understanding of the relationship between domestic politics and foreign policy in democracies in the different regional contexts (Kesgin and Kaarbo, 2010; Miyagi, 2009; Neto and Malamud,

2015; Ozkececi-Taner, 2005; Pijovic, 2016). However, the existing research has not examined how parliamentary members respond to electoral concerns in deciding the direction of the foreign policy, specifically their roll call behavior. Accordingly, our study can fill a gap in the empirical analysis of MPs' behavior in foreign and security policy outside of Western countries. Furthermore, our study confirms that electoral concerns play an important role in determining legislative members' behavior, as demonstrated by the existing scholarship.

## 4 Empirical Analysis

### 4.1 Roll Call Votes on War Issues

The unit of analysis is the Korea National Assembly (KNA) members' roll call votes on the Iraq and Afghanistan War bills during the 16th (2000-2004) and the 17th (2004-2008) session. War votes include dispatching the Republic of Korea (ROK) forces to Iraq and Afghanistan and extending the deployment of troops in both regions. It is worth noting that our study examines the roll call behavior of Korean legislative members in the single-member district (SMD). South Korea has adopted a mixed electoral system that combines a plurality voting system with proportional representation (PR). In the 16th KNA, 46 of the 273 seats were based on proportional representation while in the 17th KNA, 56 of the 299 seats were proportionally allocated to each party's share of the vote.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>3</sup>During the period between 1998 to 2007, two liberal presidents Kim Dae-Jung and Roh Moo-Hyun held the presidency, and their two liberal parties, the Millennium Democratic Party (MDP) and the Uri Party (UP), occupied the position of the ruling parties. The major conservative party was the Grand National Party (GNP). There was another conservative party as well, the United Liberal Democrats (ULD). The ULD formed a coalition with President Kim Dae-Jung at the beginning of his presidency, but their alliance crumbled in 2000. In the 17th Korean National Assembly (KNA), the Democratic Labor Party (DLP), which was more left-leaning than other liberal parties, entered the KNA despite the small percentage of seats won. While the GNP controlled a majority in the 16th KNA resulting in "divided government," the UP took a majority of seats in the 17th, leading to a "unified government."

There were 22 votes about the Iraq War and the Afghanistan War issues during the 16th and 17th KNA session. We exclude 2 votes passed with unanimous consent. Thus, a total of 20 votes is examined in a pooled model. We codify roll call votes by indicating a 1 if is in support of war bills and a 0 if it is against war bills. We use the National Assembly of the Republic of Korea Bill Information System to record each members' roll call decision. Korean MPs have two options if they abstain; an active abstention case where legislators push the abstention button and an inactive abstention case where they do not push any button or leave the floor. Since the bills can be passed only in the case where a majority of support is secured, a significant number of active abstentions can prevent the bill from passing. For this reason, the existing study regards an active abstention as an actual "nay vote" (Nemoto, 2009). In our study, we count obvious support and opposition as a "yea" or "nay" vote at the first stage.

Our study utilizes a logit analysis with a random-effect (Bell and Jones, 2015). Ideally, a fixed-effect model can be adopted to control unobserved heterogeneity across legislators. Unfortunately, a large proportion of observations drop out due to lack of variation in the roll call votes among many MPs. Accordingly, we rely on a random-effect model. We also include the bill-fixed effects to control legislation-specific characteristics. The standard approach to estimating the variance-covariance matrix of the data assumes one value characterizes the variance across observations and that no observations are correlated with other observations. However, if observational units are correlated, the homoscedastic and independence assumptions are violated. To remedy those violations, we cluster on each legislator (Arceneaux and Nickerson, 2009; Aronow, Samii and Assenova, 2015). Accordingly, the cluster-robust standard errors at the legislator level provide consistent standard errors.

For the robustness checks, we regard active abstentions as nay votes. After that, we also address the difference among yeas, nays, and abstentions brought up by other scholars (Rich, 2014; Rosas, Shomer and Haptonstahl, 2015). To capture such variations, roll call votes are coded on a 1-3 scale. The lowest score (which implies the strong objection) is given a nay vote. An active abstention is assigned score 2, while the yea vote is coded 3.<sup>4</sup>

## 4.2 Electoral Marginality in Korean Politics

There has been a great discussion concerning the proper measure of electoral competitiveness among many scholars (Ansolabehere and Jones, 2010; Cox, 1988; Jacobson, 1987; Kuklinski, 1977; Sullivan and Uslander, 1978). Similarly, measurement of electoral marginality is not well-grounded in the context of South Korean politics (Aran, 2011; Cho, 2006). Although most electoral competitions in South Korea were held between two major conservative and liberal parties, e.g., GNP vs. MDP or UP, competitive electoral contests occurred due to the presence of viable third party candidates in some districts.<sup>5</sup> Thus, the two-candidate margin might underestimate the competitiveness of the district under the existence of the viable third party candidate (Endersby, Galatas and Rackaway, 2002). However, scholars indicate that there are no meaningful differences between the two-candidate margin and the other indicators, such as entropy and k-party margin in measuring electoral competitiveness in South Korean politics (Yun and Joo, 2010).

To codify the marginality, we use a modified version of fluid vulnerability in the 16th

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<sup>4</sup>Because the dependent variable consists of discrete ordinal numbers (1-3), an ordered logit model is used to estimate the likelihood of roll call votes on war bills.

<sup>5</sup>In the 16th Korean general election, 37.8% of single member districts showed that a total vote share of the winner and the second-best candidate was below 80%. In the 17th general election, 23.5% of districts was recorded. When we utilize the 16th presidential vote share, only 2.3% of district was less than 90% of a total vote share of the winner and the second-best candidate indicating most of districts vote margin is captured by the two-party candidate margin.

Korean presidential election, assuming that legislative members use past presidential election results to predict their expected future electoral performance (Bartels, 1991; Cohen and Rottinghaus, 2018; Griffin, 2006; Kuklinski, 1977; MacRae, 1952). The 16th presidential election was conducted in December 2002 before the dates at which all the roll call votes in our sample were made. We follow the existing studies' formula to calculate marginality (Cohen and Rottinghaus, 2018);  $(1 - \text{vote margin})$ , where vote margin is defined as  $(\text{winner's vote} - \text{loser's vote}) / (\text{winner's vote} + \text{loser's vote})$ . Lower competitiveness scores indicate greater safety while higher scores indicate greater competitiveness. Scores for the competitiveness range from the safest district (0.058) to the most competitive districts (1) for 227 single-member districts in the 16th KNA and 243 districts in the 17th KNA. It is worth noting that the formula is also applied to measure the marginality of districts where by-elections occurred. For the data of presidential vote share, we rely on vote share as reported by the election statistics of the National Election Commission of the Republic of Korea.<sup>6</sup> We focus on the interaction term between the governing party affiliation – whether Korean MPs are affiliated with the Millennium Democratic Party (MDP) and the Uri Party (UP) and the district competitiveness in order to examine the effect of electoral marginality on vote for war bills. We also look at the interaction term between the conservative party affiliation – whether MPs are affiliated with the Grand National Party (GNP) and the United Liberal Democrats (ULD) and the district competitiveness. For a robustness check, we measure the district competitiveness based on legislators' vote share in the 16th and 17th KNA elections by utilizing the same formula described above.

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<sup>6</sup>Republic of Korea National Election Commission. <http://info.nec.go.kr/> (accessed April 22,2020).

### 4.3 Confounding Factors

In our study, we control for several factors which might affect the estimation. Our study includes district liberalism based on the district-level vote for liberal candidate Roh Moo-Hyun in the 16th presidential election in December 2002, expecting that MPs in the liberal district are less likely to vote for war bills. Several studies have relied on presidential vote share as a reliable proxy of measuring district preferences (Ansolabehere and Jones, 2010; Canes-Wrone, Brady and Cogan, 2002; Griffin, 2006; Holian, Krebs and Walsh, 1997; Levendusky, Pope and Jackman, 2008). While a growing number of studies use a Bayesian latent variable model to measure district preference (Selb and Munzert, 2011; Tausanovitch and Warshaw, 2013; Warshaw and Rodden, 2012), a consensus on a proper measurement has not been achieved yet. We posit that presidential vote share is a relatively good proxy of measurement of district preference in South Korean legislative politics. Concerning foreign policy issues, liberal districts will be more likely to be against war and sending troops. Accordingly, members of KNA in liberal districts are more likely vote against war bills than their counterparts in conservative districts. Of course, members of KNA might interpret a high vote share of the president as strong support for the president. Thus, MPs from the districts where its share of the presidential vote is high will be more likely to vote for war bills since MPs expect to receive pork barrel.<sup>7</sup>

Along with presidential vote share, we make use of an average of public opinion on troop dispatch to Iraq and Afghanistan aggregated by various polling organizations at the national

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<sup>7</sup>In contrast to the study of Kwon (2005), other studies suggest that the president allocate more resources to municipalities where its share of the presidential vote is higher than other municipalities (Horiuchi and Lee, 2008; Kang, 2015)

level. We assume that members of SMD are responsive to the variation of public opinion at the national level since the popularity of issues influences their electoral fate. We also consider whether presidential popularity at the national level affects roll call votes. Gender also plays an important role in the foreign policy arena (Koch and Fulton, 2011; Swers, 2007). The anti-war movement was organized by a group of female Korean MPs in partnership with women's grassroots groups during the legislative debates on the Iraq War troop dispatch. At the same time, however, resources and endorsements from the president and the party leadership were necessary for female candidates to be able to win in the primary due to a substantial gender bias in South Korean politics. Seniority is another controlling element, assuming that senior legislators have more leeway to be autonomous than newly elected legislators. Seniority is then coded on a 1-3 scale. Newly elected legislators are coded on scale 1. Re-elected legislators are coded on scale 2, and the legislators who are elected more than three times are coded on scale 3. MPs who are a member of the defense committee of KNA will be more likely to support troop dispatch or be more conservative in the use of force. In the 16th KNA, 20 out of 273 MPs were the members of the Defense Committee. In the 17th KNA, 20 out of 299 were the members of the committee. Lastly, we consider whether the MPs are affiliated with the Democratic Labor Party (DLP). The DLP was considered the only programmatic party in the 16th and 17th KNAs. The DLP presented a coherent opposition against the troop dispatch to Iraq and Afghanistan.

#### **4.4 Findings and Discussions**

We present the estimates of the logistic regression in Table 1. As suggested in the hypothesis 1, the electoral marginality hypothesis suggests that legislative members of the governing

party in competitive districts are less likely to vote for war bills than those in safe districts. We can investigate this conditional relationship by using an interaction term between the governing party membership and district competitiveness in Model 2 in Table 1. Since it is challenging to draw interpretation from the coefficient of the interaction term (Brambor, Clark and Golder, 2006), we turn to a graphical presentation of the effects of our key interaction term in Figure 2.

In Figure 2, we plot the predicted probability of roll-call vote on war issues across the range of district competitiveness from 0.05 (the safest) to 1 (the most competitive).<sup>8</sup> Increasing district competitiveness decreases the predicted probability of roll-call vote on war bills by governing party members. The gap between the opposition and the governing party declines as the district competitiveness increases. In less competitive districts, where the competitiveness is 0.2, the predicted probability of their representatives to align with the party majority is 94 percent if they are in the president's party; the probability is 89 percent if they are in the opposition party. The probability of voting for war bills by the members of the governing party decreases as district competitiveness increases. At the point where the competitiveness is 0.8, the governing party members are more likely to defect from the party line than their opposition counterparts, while the confidence intervals overlap. Specifically, the member of the governing party in the safest district where the district's prior presidential vote margin is 93 percentage points has 96 percent chance to vote for war bills. On the other hand, the member of the governing party in the most competitive district where the presidential vote margin is 0.04 percentage point has 79 percent chance to vote for war bills.

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<sup>8</sup>We report predicted probabilities via the observed-value approach following the suggestions by Hanmer and Ozan Kalkan (2013). Long and Freese (2006, 245) also points out that the observed-value approach is the best summary of the effect of a variable since it averages the effects across all cases in the sample. Accordingly, the average marginal effect can be interpreted as the average size of the effect in the sample.

Table 1: The Conditional Impact of Electoral Marginality on Roll Call Votes on War Bills in Korea National Assembly 16th and 17th: Single Member District

DV: Roll Call Votes on War Issues	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
District Competitiveness	-3.25*** (0.97)	-1.75 (1.14)	-2.35*** (0.87)	-1.20 (1.19)
Governing Party Member	0.39 (0.47)	2.26*** (0.69)		
Governing Party Member*District Competitiveness		-2.80*** (1.00)		
Conservative Party Member			1.55*** (0.56)	4.08* (2.31)
Conservative Party Member*District Competitiveness				-2.90 (2.76)
Defense Committee Member	1.70** (0.76)	1.58** (0.76)	1.76** (0.80)	1.75** (0.80)
Public Opinion on War (National Level)	0.018 (0.053)	0.016 (0.053)	0.015 (0.052)	0.015 (0.052)
Presidential Vote Share (District Level)	-0.093*** (0.018)	-0.098*** (0.017)	-0.058*** (0.017)	-0.039* (0.021)
Presidential Approval Rate (National Level)	0.041 (0.034)	0.036 (0.034)	0.032 (0.033)	0.033 (0.033)
Female Member	-2.90*** (0.67)	-2.86*** (0.67)	-2.77*** (0.73)	-2.76*** (0.72)
Seniority	0.93*** (0.22)	0.89*** (0.22)	0.76*** (0.20)	0.78*** (0.20)
Constant	8.09** (3.29)	7.66** (3.28)	5.72* (3.28)	3.72 (3.44)
<i>N</i>	3108	3108	3108	3108
Vote Dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Random Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Log Likelihood	-752.7	-748.6	-747.2	-746.7

The DLP predicts the failure perfectly and then it is dropped from the analysis.

War votes dummies are included but not shown.

Robust standard errors are clustered by MPs and are in parentheses.

\*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$

The estimation results hold their significance when we consider active abstention as a nay vote as seen in Table 2 in the Appendix.




Figure 2: Predicted Effects on Roll Call Votes on War Bills in 16th and 17th KNA (SMD)  
 Note: The figure reports predicted effects of the membership of the governing party on roll call votes on war bills across the range of district competitiveness. Estimates are obtained from the interaction term of Model 2 in Table 1. District competitiveness score ranges from 0.05 (the safest) to 1 (the most competitive). The red line indicates governing party members. The blue line indicates opposition party members. Dashed line represents a 90 percent confidence interval. The vertical lines are underlined to indicate where the observations are located across the range of district competitiveness.

We also use MPs' vote margin as an indicator of electoral competitiveness instead of using presidential vote margin. In Table 1 in the Appendix, the interaction term reaches a weak statistical significance ( $P=0.08$ ), regardless of whether we consider active abstention as a nay vote. The empirical analysis of roll call vote in war issues confirms that the governing

party members are more likely to defect from the president with the increase of their electoral vulnerability.

The electoral vulnerability does not affect the roll call decision of conservative opposition party members. In Model 4 in Table 1, the interaction term does not reach statistical significance, while showing a negative sign. The conservative opposition sticks to their party line despite their electoral vulnerability. This result confirms that conservative opposition party members strongly support the ROK-US alliance issue despite a harsh political confrontation with the president in domestic politics.

Among the coefficients for other confounding variables, several are both statistically significant and in the expected direction in Table 1. KNA members from liberal districts are much less supportive of sending troops to Iraq and Afghanistan than their counterparts from conservative districts; this result is consistent with preceding studies indicating that district liberalism plays an essential role in roll call behavior. Simultaneously, neither district competitiveness nor presidential vote share shows a positive effect on MPs' decision to vote for war bills. These findings contradict the notion that representatives from the districts in which the president had a high vote share or had competitive races are more likely to align with the government due to expectations for pork-barrel (Horiuchi and Lee, 2008; Kwon, 2005; Kang, 2015).

The coefficients for female KNA member variables are negative and significant, confirming that female members of KNA are less prone to war than their male counterparts. Seniority and defense committee membership also show significant positive effects as we have expected.

Overall, we find that governing party members are more likely to defect from the president as their electoral vulnerability increases in war issues, while the vulnerability does not affect

the conservative opposition party member's roll call decision.

## 4.5 Robustness Checks

We carried out some additional analysis to explore interesting extensions and probe the sensitivity of our findings. All results are described below and reported in the tables and figures in the Appendix.

### Ideology

A group of research points to ideology as a key explanatory factor of roll call behavior in foreign policy area (DeLaet and Scott, 2006; Fordham, 2008; Holian, Krebs and Walsh, 1997; Lindsay and Ripley, 1992; LeoGrande and Brenner, 1993; Poole and Rosenthal, 2007; McCormick and Black, 1983). In South Korean politics, the influx of MPs who have different ideological backgrounds has emboldened the partisan divergence on foreign policy. While liberal MPs sought to avoid the involvement of war in Iraq and Afghanistan, conservative MPs believed that South Korea had to assist the US through the troop deployment.

Despite a growing number of studies on measuring ideological dimensions based on the NOMINATE scale in South Korean legislative politics, we rely on legislators' self-placement on the liberal-conservative scale, one of the most direct measurements of ideology. As Burden, Caldeira and Groseclose (2000)'s study on comparing various measurements of ideology indicates, a direct measurement of ideology operates well compared to other indicators. To measure ideology, we use the surveys that were conducted by Joongang Daily and the Korean Party Studies Association in 2002 for the 16th KNA and in 2005 for the 17th KNA. The response rate is 86% (238 out of 273 members) in the 16th KNA and 78% in the 17th

KNA (Daily and Association, 2002, 2005). The survey asked KNA members to place their ideology at a point from 0 (most liberal) to 10 (most conservative) on their own. The effect of district competitiveness still holds when we control the ideology of KNA members as seen in Model 2 of Table 3 in the Appendix. While omitting 25% of observations in our sample due to KNA members' non-response to the question about their self-placement ideology in the survey. As we expected, Korean MPs who are more conservative than other MPs cast more votes for sending troops. The predicted probabilities in Figure 2 based on Model 2 of Table 3 in the Appendix show us that governing party members in competitive districts are less likely to vote for war bills as their district competitiveness increases.

### **Ordinal Analysis**

We examine whether the results hold when we consider yea, active abstention, and nay as an ordered outcome ranging from completely opposed to completely supported. In Table 4 in the Appendix, we re-run our main analysis by using ordered logit analysis. The interaction term between the governing party affiliation and the electoral marginality shows a significant negative effect across all models, regardless of the inclusion of ideology variables. The sign of coefficients in ordinal logit models provides directional information in the likelihood of roll call votes on war bills. A negative coefficient indicates a decreased likelihood of supporting war bills. Overall, the president's co-partisans are more likely to defect from the president and pander to their constituents as they face electoral vulnerability.

## Party List

One would assume that party list legislators would be less likely to deviate from the party position. MPs elected through closed party lists should align with the party's demand because their re-election depends on their party's electoral success. In contrast, MPs in single-member districts have more leeway on their behavior since they can build personalized support among their districts (Mitchell, 2000; Sieberer, 2010). If party list legislators are not more likely to defect from the party position and the president, this would give indirect support for electoral consideration influencing single-member district governing party members' defections in war votes. If party list legislators are just as likely to defect from the party position and the president as their district counterparts, this would weaken our argument electoral marginality.

In the South Korean context, the president, as an actual party leader, has had a great influence in the candidate selection process. MPs in the party list in South Korea do not mostly run again in the party list despite the non-existence of term limit. They are eager to seek legislative offices by running in single member districts. If they decide to run in a single member district, they need an endorsement from the president or the party leadership to compete with candidates from single member districts in the party primary due to their lack of assets and stature in the districts. Accordingly, party list MPs are hard to vote against the president and the party line to win the candidacy.

In Table 5 in the Appendix, we conduct the estimations, including both single member districts and party lists. To examine the effect of party list on voting on war, we include the interaction term between the governing party affiliation and party list. The interaction

term does not reach statistical significance at any levels across different model specifications, while it shows a positive sign. This empirical result strengthens our arguments for the effects of electoral competitiveness in the governing party members of a single member district.

## 5 Conclusion

Research on domestic politics on foreign policy has moved away from an exclusive focus on presidents and executives and includes the role of legislatures. With the exception of Western democracies, however, few studies pay attention to democratic legislatures in other regions - and whether these members of parliament are responsive to constituency preferences as well. The roll call behavior of South Korean members of parliament suggests constituencies have become important in foreign policy debates in East Asian democracy.

Drawing on the concept of electoral marginality, we examined whether electoral concerns affect the roll call behavior of South Korean MP's on war issues. We found that the president's co-partisans are less likely to vote for the war bills, driven by the president and administration when electoral competitiveness increases in their districts. This finding points to an increased role of the constituency as the reason why co-partisans do not align with the president in war issues. Our empirical finding also indicates that electoral marginality does not have much influence on conservative party members' roll call behavior on war bills. This modest effect may result from the fact that conservative parties have shown strong support for US-ROK alliance issues. These findings suggest that while electoral marginality affects foreign policy roll call voting of Korean MPs, its impact is contingent upon partisan divisions. We also confirmed that various factors that drive roll call votes in foreign policy issues in US and European countries have substantial effects on roll call behavior in South

Korea.

By providing a novel, statistical analysis of roll call behavior of South Korean parliamentary members, this study sets the stage for the future case study on legislative divisions over the issue of foreign policy and war in non-Western countries. A harsh legislative debate in the Turkish Grand National Assembly (TGNA) on the issue of US troop deployment during the Iraq War brought attention to the role of parliaments in foreign policy in a different regional context. There are also persistent parliament debates in Japan over bills that would allow Japan's military, known as the Self-Defense Forces, to provide logistical support and in some cases armed backup to allied armies in overseas conflicts. This study reinforces the premise that constituency matters in parliaments debates over foreign policy. The study also provides grounds for further investigation to improve the understanding of legislative division in foreign policy beyond the context of Western democracies.

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## Appendix

- **District Competitiveness based on Legislators' Vote Margin** In Table 1 in Appendix, we examine the effects of electoral competitiveness on roll call votes on war issues using legislators' votes share in the 16th and 17th KNA elections. We use the same formula we utilized in measuring district competitiveness based on the vote margin in the presidential election. Scores for the district competitiveness range between 0.061 to 0.999 in the 16th KNA and range between 0.275 to 0.999 in the 16th KNA. In Model 2 in Table 1, interaction term reaches a weak statistical significance ( $P=0.08$ ), regardless of whether I consider active abstention as a nay vote (Model 4). In Figure 1, the illustration of predicted probabilities shows that governing party members are less likely to vote for war bills as their district competitiveness increases. While not included in Appendix, the interaction term between conservative opposition party and district competitiveness, however, does not reach statistical significance while the terms show a negative sign.
- **Active Abstention as a Nay Vote** In Table 2, we re-run our main models in the main body, considering active abstention as a nay vote. The interaction term between the governing party affiliation and the electoral marginality shows a negative direction across all the models, regardless of the inclusion of ideology variables.
- **Ideology Included** In Table 3, we re-run our main models in the main body, including ideology variables. The interaction term between the governing party affiliation and the electoral marginality shows a negative direction with a statistical significance across all the models, while the number of observation decreases due to non-response.
- **Ordered Logistic Regression** In Table 4, we re-run our main analysis by considering nay, active abstention, and yav votes as an ordered categorical variables. The interaction term between the governing party affiliation and the electoral marginality shows a negative direction across all the models, regardless of the inclusion of ideology variable. This indicates a decreased likelihood of supporting war bills by governing party members with an increased electoral competitiveness.
- **Party List** In Table 5, we examine the effect of party list in war issues across different model specifications. The party list members of the governing party are not more likely to vote for war bills.
- **Descriptive Statistics on Numeric Variables (War Votes)** In Table 6, we present descriptive statistics on numeric variables in the data set of war votes.
- **Figure 1** The figure reports predicted effects of party affiliation on roll call votes on war bills across the range of district competitiveness of KNA members. Estimates are obtained from the interaction term between the governing party members and district competitiveness of Model 2 of Table 1 in Appendix.
- **Figure 2** The figure reports predicted effects of party affiliation on roll call votes on war bills across the range of district competitiveness of KNA members. Estimates are

obtained from the interaction term between the governing party members and district competitiveness of Model 2 of Table 3 in Appendix.

Table 2: The Conditional Impact of Electoral Marginality on Roll Call Votes on War Bills in Korea National Assembly 16th and 17th: Single Member District (MPs' vote margin as an indicator of the district competitiveness)

DV: Roll Call Votes on War Issues	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Governing Party Member	0.040 (0.47)	2.17* (1.20)	0.077 (0.32)	1.87* (1.01)
District Competitiveness	-1.68** (0.79)	-0.26 (1.12)	-1.12* (0.61)	-0.084 (0.86)
Governing Party Member*District Competitiveness		-2.63* (1.50)		-2.19* (1.23)
Defense Committee Member	1.59** (0.80)	1.64** (0.81)	1.52** (0.60)	1.54** (0.61)
Public Opinion on War (National Level)	0.018 (0.052)	0.018 (0.052)	-0.026 (0.036)	-0.025 (0.036)
Presidential Vote Share (District Level)	-0.065*** (0.011)	-0.068*** (0.011)	-0.034*** (0.0073)	-0.037*** (0.0072)
Presidential Approval Rate (National Level)	0.041 (0.034)	0.041 (0.035)	0.031 (0.022)	0.031 (0.022)
Female Member	-2.82*** (0.65)	-2.89*** (0.66)	-1.65*** (0.47)	-1.70*** (0.47)
Seniority	0.87*** (0.22)	0.87*** (0.22)	0.67*** (0.16)	0.66*** (0.16)
Constant	5.97* (3.07)	5.03 (3.14)	4.43** (2.16)	3.77* (2.19)
<i>N</i>	3108	3108	3320	3320
Vote Dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Random Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Log Likelihood	-759.2	-757.5	-1136.9	-1135.0

The DLP predicts the failure perfectly and then it is dropped from the analysis.

War votes dummies are included but not shown. Model 3 and 4 regard active abstention as a nay vote.

Robust standard errors are clustered by MPs and are in parentheses.

\*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$

Table 3: The Conditional Impact of Electoral Marginality on Roll Call Votes on War Bills in Korea National Assembly 16th and 17th: Single Member District (Active abstention as a nay vote)

DV: Roll Call Votes on War Issues	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Governing Party Member	0.29 (0.32)	1.98*** (0.64)	1.01*** (0.33)	2.86*** (0.65)
District Competitiveness	-1.83*** (0.51)	-0.65 (0.67)	-1.93*** (0.59)	-0.73 (0.71)
Governing Party Member*District Competitiveness		-2.40*** (0.82)		-2.55*** (0.84)
Defense Committee Member	1.57*** (0.57)	1.53*** (0.58)	1.30** (0.59)	1.35** (0.59)
Public Opinion on War (National Level)	-0.026 (0.036)	-0.027 (0.036)	-0.074 (0.049)	-0.075 (0.049)
Presidential Vote Share (District Level)	-0.046*** (0.0087)	-0.053*** (0.0087)	-0.037*** (0.0098)	-0.046*** (0.0096)
Presidential Approval Rate (National Level)	0.032 (0.021)	0.027 (0.021)	0.0091 (0.027)	0.0053 (0.027)
Female Member	-1.64*** (0.47)	-1.62*** (0.46)	-1.50*** (0.46)	-1.48*** (0.48)
Seniority	0.70*** (0.15)	0.68*** (0.15)	0.54*** (0.17)	0.54*** (0.17)
Ideology			0.71*** (0.12)	0.68*** (0.12)
Constant	5.23** (2.17)	4.99** (2.16)	4.65 (2.95)	4.43 (2.94)
<i>N</i>	3320	3320	2453	2453
Vote Dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Log Likelihood	-1132.5	-1127.7	-770.5	-766.1

The DLP predicts the failure perfectly and then it is dropped from the analysis.

War votes dummies are included but not shown. Model 3 and 4 include ideology variable.

Robust standard errors are clustered by MPs and are in parentheses.

\*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$

Table 4: The Conditional Impact of Electoral Marginality on Roll Call Votes on War Bills in Korea National Assembly 16th and 17th: Single Member District (Ideology included)

DV: Roll Call Votes on War Issues	Model 1	Model 2
Governing Party Member	1.16** (0.46)	3.07*** (0.72)
District Competitiveness	-3.08*** (1.08)	-1.67 (1.20)
Governing Party Member*District Competitiveness		-2.77*** (1.02)
Defense Committee Member	1.25 (0.79)	1.25 (0.82)
Public Opinion on War (National Level)	-0.026 (0.074)	-0.026 (0.074)
Presidential Vote Share (District Level)	-0.069*** (0.019)	-0.076*** (0.018)
Presidential Approval Rate (National Level)	0.013 (0.042)	0.0087 (0.042)
Female Member	-2.26*** (0.65)	-2.24*** (0.68)
Seniority	0.54** (0.25)	0.54** (0.24)
Ideology	1.02*** (0.17)	0.98*** (0.17)
Constant	5.46 (4.52)	5.10 (4.49)
<i>N</i>	2319	2319
Vote Dummies	Yes	Yes
Random Effects	Yes	Yes
Log Likelihood	-508.7	-505.4

The DLP predicts the failure perfectly and then it is dropped from the analysis.

War votes dummies are included but not shown.

Robust standard errors are clustered by MPs and are in parentheses.

\*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$

Table 5: The Conditional Impact of Electoral Marginality on Roll Call Votes on War Bills in Korea National Assembly 16th and 17th: Single Member District (Ordered logit analysis)

DV: Roll Call Votes on War Issues	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Governing Party Member	0.42 (0.35)	2.16*** (0.66)	1.14*** (0.35)	3.01*** (0.69)
District Competitiveness	-1.93*** (0.54)	-0.67 (0.72)	-2.06*** (0.63)	-0.80 (0.76)
Governing Party Member*District Competitiveness		-2.53*** (0.86)		-2.65*** (0.88)
Defense Committee Member	1.55** (0.61)	1.49** (0.62)	1.33** (0.62)	1.37** (0.63)
Public Opinion on War (National Level)	-0.011 (0.035)	-0.012 (0.035)	-0.069 (0.048)	-0.069 (0.048)
Presidential Vote Share (District Level)	-0.053*** (0.0094)	-0.060*** (0.0093)	-0.043*** (0.011)	-0.051*** (0.010)
Presidential Approval Rate (National Level)	0.043* (0.023)	0.038* (0.023)	0.017 (0.029)	0.014 (0.029)
Female Member	-1.95*** (0.53)	-1.94*** (0.51)	-1.83*** (0.50)	-1.80*** (0.52)
Seniority	0.73*** (0.16)	0.71*** (0.16)	0.56*** (0.18)	0.56*** (0.18)
Democratic Labor Party	-29.4*** (1.19)	-29.4*** (1.17)	-25.5*** (1.24)	-25.6*** (1.22)
Ideology			0.74*** (0.12)	0.71*** (0.12)
Cut 1	-5.54*** (2.14)	-5.26** (2.14)	-5.32* (2.94)	-5.07* (2.93)
Cut 2	-4.66** (2.14)	-4.39** (2.14)	-4.50 (2.94)	-4.26 (2.94)
Constant	5.03*** (0.92)	4.69*** (0.86)	3.76*** (0.82)	3.40*** (0.77)
<i>N</i>	3331	3331	2464	2464
Vote Dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Random Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Log Likelihood	-1486.5	-1481.2	-994.7	-990.0

Robust standard errors are clustered MPs and are in parentheses.

War vote id dummies are included but not shown. \*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$

Table 6: The Effects of Party List on Roll Call Votes on War Issues: 16th and 17th Korean National Assembly

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Governing Party Member	-0.69 (0.45)	0.39 (0.44)	-0.33 (0.30)	0.56* (0.32)
Party List	0.21 (0.58)	0.24 (0.66)	0.17 (0.45)	0.28 (0.48)
Governing Party Member*Party List	-0.47 (0.73)	-0.60 (0.84)	-0.58 (0.62)	-0.67 (0.70)
Defense Committee Member	1.84** (0.73)	0.81 (0.81)	1.62*** (0.53)	0.89 (0.61)
Public Opinion on War (National Level)	0.038 (0.047)	0.013 (0.061)	-0.00092 (0.032)	-0.028 (0.040)
Presidential Approval Rate (National Level)	0.045 (0.028)	0.025 (0.035)	0.039** (0.019)	0.024 (0.023)
Female Member	-1.47*** (0.56)	-1.29** (0.63)	-0.89** (0.44)	-0.91* (0.48)
Seniority	0.87*** (0.19)	0.64*** (0.23)	0.69*** (0.15)	0.64*** (0.17)
The Democratic Labor Party (DLP)	-11.3*** (2.01)	-7.59*** (2.02)	-8.88*** (1.54)	-6.24*** (1.66)
Ideology		1.07*** (0.15)		0.75*** (0.11)
Constant	0.48 (2.69)	-2.59 (3.62)	0.65 (1.89)	-1.21 (2.45)
<i>N</i>	3838	2912	4112	3093
Vote Dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Random Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Log Likelihood	-964.7	-673.6	-1399.5	-982.5

Robust standard errors are clustered MPs and are in parentheses in all Models.

War vote id dummies are included but not shown. \*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$

Table 7: Descriptive Statistics on Numeric Variables in the Data Set of War Votes

Variables	Observations	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Roll Call Votes on War Bills (Nay / Yay)	3,838	.8256905	.3794249	0	1
Roll Call Votes on War Bills (Ordered)	4,112	1.607977	.750911	0	2
Liberal Governing Party Member	4,112	.4713035	.4992365	0	1
Defense Committee Member	4,112	.0671206	.2502612	0	1
Public Opinion (National Level)	4,112	38.92023	9.120166	22.4	50.1
Presidential Approval Rate (National Level)	4,112	26.85058	11.80065	16.1	59.6
Female Member	4,112	.118677	.3234474	0	1
Seniority	4,112	1.607247	.7987317	1	3
The Democratic Labor Party	4,112	.0233463	.1510192	0	1
District Competitiveness	3,331	.7054576	.2893071	.0586629	1
Ideology	3,093	4.593922	1.492106	1	8




Figure E1: Predicted Effects on Roll Call Votes on War Bills in 16th and 17th KNA  
 Note: The figure reports predicted effects of party affiliation on roll call votes on war bills across the range of district competitiveness of KNA members. Estimates are obtained from the interaction term of Model 2 of Table 1 in Appendix. District competitiveness score ranges from 0.05 (the safest) to 1 (the most competitive). The red line indicates governing party members. The blue line indicates opposition party members. Dashed line represents a 90 percent confidence interval. The vertical lines are underlined to indicate where the observations are located across the range of district competitiveness.




Figure E2: Predicted Effects on Roll Call Votes on War Bills in 16th and 17th KNA

Note: The figure reports predicted effects of party affiliation on roll call votes on war bills across the range of district competitiveness of KNA members. Estimates are obtained from the interaction term of Model 2 of Table 3 in Appendix. District competitiveness score ranges from 0.05 (the safest) to 1 (the most competitive). The red line indicates governing party members. The blue line indicates opposition party members. Dashed line represents a 90 percent confidence interval. The vertical lines are underlined to indicate where the observations are located across the range of district competitiveness.