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Peer-Reviewed Publications
Kyung Suk Lee, James D. Kim, Hwalmin Jin, and Matthew Fuhrmann “Nuclear Weapons and Low-Level Military Conflict” (International Studies Quarterly, Online First) DOI: 10.1093/ISQ/SQAC067
Hwalmin Jin, “Why Do Small States Adopt Divergent Alignment Policies? : The Alignment Policies of Indonesia and Thailand in the Early 1950s” 2022. Korea and Global Affairs [한국과 국제사회], 6 (2): 365-385 (Download)
Hwalmin Jin, “Are Women More Peace-Oriented Than Their Male Colleagues? : Korean Women Legislators’ Voting Behavior on War Bills” 2022. Korea and World Review [한국과 세계], 4 (3): 173-192 (Download)
Hwalmin Jin and Yongmin Kim “우크라이나 사태로 바라본 유럽의 에너지 식량 안보 (European Energy and Food Security from Ukraine Crisis)” 2022. EU 연구 [EU Studies], 62: 11-36 (Korean) (Download)
Working Papers
Hwalmin Jin, “Civilian Control Endeavor: Latent Concept and Measurement” (Revise & Resubmit)
Abstract
Despite the critical importance of understanding civilian control efforts and their linkage to leader survival and interstate relations, there has been a dearth of research on civilian control efforts. The vast majority of these studies have viewed civilian control as a consequence rather than a dynamic process in which political leaders work to limit the military’s influence. We propose that various behavioral manifestations can capture the latent trait of a combined effort to reduce the military’s influence. We use Bayesian item response theory (IRT) to account for the inherent uncertainty inherent in operationalizing control endeavors. Between 1965 and 2005, a Bayesian IRT estimation process produces a posterior mean estimate of the varying degree of control effort across countries and time periods.
Hwalmin Jin, “Civilian Control Endeavor in the Shadow of External Security Threats” (Under Review)
Abstract
Why do authoritarian leaders alter the extent of their civilian control efforts? Our study examines the effect of external security threats on the levels of civilian control efforts to reduce the military’s influence in non-democratic regimes. We argue that as external security threats increase, authoritarian leaders relax their efforts to reduce the military’s influence in order to maintain military effectiveness, while they increase their endeavors in the face of a low-level external security threat. We measure a latent trait of civilian control endeavor using Bayesian item response theory (IRT). Existing research has examined the relationship between external security threats and civil-military relations, focusing on the military’s direct intervention in politics, but not on how leaders modify their efforts to reduce the military’s influence strategically. A cross-national quantitative empirical analysis ranging from 1965 to 2005 presents a novel finding that external security threats significantly affect the estimated latent civilian control effort.
Hwalmin Jin, “Civilian Control Endeavor and Political Leader Survival” (in progress)
Hwalmin Jin, “Korean Legislative Voting on War Issues” (Under Review)
Abstract
We investigate how electoral concerns at the district level affect foreign policy issues by examining the individual legislators’ roll call decisions on the issue of sending troops to Iraq in the South Korea National Assembly. Our central claim is that South Korean legislators are sensitive to electoral concern when they decide to vote for war bills. The empirical findings confirm that there is a growing divergence of legislators’ roll call behavior depending on their electoral marginality. However, the effect of a constituency is contingent upon partisan cleavages. The study represents the first empirical examination of the use of force in roll call vote behavior outside of the U.S. and Europe, focusing on electoral marginality. The study also affords interesting tests of several hypotheses concerning the factors driving legislative voting behavior in the realm of military policy.
Hwalmin Jin, “Ethnic Stacking and Inequality in Armed Forces and Spatial Dependence” (in progress)
Weiwen Yin and Hwalmin Jin, “Bilateral Trade and Public and Private Mobilization” (in progress)
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